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dWrong-site surgery (WSS) is probably the most dramatic,
visible and devastating experience for the patient and can have
serious detrimental impact on the surgeon and anesthesiologist
involved. Even with formal site veriﬁcation, surgery at a site
other than that involved in the disease process continues to oc-
cur frequently. It is arguably the error most feared by surgeons
and anesthesiologists alike! We describe two cases of wrong-
sided surgery as a platform to summarize the available litera-
ture with an emphasis on strategies to prevent such errors from
harming patients and the role of anesthesiologist in implemen-
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A 20 year old woman presented to the outpatient surgical service
with complaints of a lump in her left breast. On clinical examina-
tion and later on histopathological examination this was diag-
nosed as a case of left breast ﬁbroadenoma. However, on the
out-patientdepartment (OPD)card, the treating surgeon inadver-
tentlyenteredtheexaminedsiteasarightbreastﬁbroadenomaand
planned for lumpectomy of a right breast lump. The resident doc-
tor on the surgical ﬂoor that day, without reexamining the patient
clinically, entered the site and name of surgery in patient’s records
merely on the basis of OPD card which mentioned the site of sur-
gery and surgical intervention by the treating surgeon.
After getting routine investigations and preanesthetic
checkup the patient was placed on the next morning’s operat-
ing room (OR) list which was made one day prior to surgery.
The OR list mentioned the site of surgery as the right breast
and the name of surgical intervention planned.
The patient was transferred to the preoperative room on
day of surgery. The staff nurse in preoperative room labeled
with tape, the site of surgery by looking at the OR list and
reading the patient’s ﬁle. In the OR, standard American Soci-
ety of Anesthesiologists (ASA) monitors were applied and the
anesthetist planned for administering general anesthesia to the
patient. The operating surgeon meanwhile went for scrubbing
and hand wash prior to surgery. As a routine protocol fol-
lowed in our anesthesia department, we reconﬁrmed the surgi-
cal intervention and site of surgery by looking in the patient
ﬁle and asking the patient of the side of surgery. To our great
surprise we found that the side of surgery labeled and printed
on OR list and patient case ﬁle was not matching the patient’s
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operating surgeon who described and reexamined the patient
and conﬁrmed the reported error. All records were rechecked,
and clinical ﬁndings were reconﬁrmed. Patient was instituted
general anesthesia and surgery was successfully done.
Postoperatively a detailed analysis of possible errors was done
by the surgical team with the anesthetist, staff nurse and the resi-
dent doctors. The possible causes of errors were evaluated and a
meticulousprotocol for preventionwas established for all patients
posted for surgery. The protocol was circulated to all concerned
departments and followed with strict compliance.
2. Case 2
A 5 year old child was admitted for ambulatory care squint
surgery on the right eye on the same day in morning at our
hospital. Routine investigations, which were done one day
prior to the surgery, were normal and thus the patient was
wheeled in OR. The pre-anesthesia room nursing staff labeled
the right eye of the child with a small adhesive tape place just
above the right eyebrow, after verifying the surgeon’s OPD
card as per routine protocol in the ophthalmology department.
In preoperative room, the child was accompanying his father
and was waiting for his turn to get operated. Meanwhile the
adhesive tape on the child’s right eye accidentally fell off and
his father unknowingly placed it again above child left eye in-
stead of right eye. The child accompanying his father was
wheeled inside the OR and anesthesia senior resident planned
for institution of general anesthesia immediately. Surgeons
without conﬁrming the eye to be operated immediately went
for scrubbing. Meanwhile the anesthesia consultant entered
the OR and enquired senior resident whether he asked the
child father about the side of eye the child have to be operated.
Senior resident, who was newly recruited in the department,
was not aware of the routine protocol being followed prior
to surgery and denied asking for the mandatory conﬁrmation
as required. Immediately the father was asked. He told the
anesthetist that the child suffers from a problem in the right
eye. The surgeon when informed checked the records and re-
examined the patient. The surgeon found that it was the right
eye which is to be operated. It was revealed afterwards by the
child’s father that he by mistake had placed the adhesive plas-
ter over the child’s left eye as he was not aware of the impor-
tance of that tape. Surgery underwent uneventful and
postoperatively the detailed discussion of the fallacy was again
discussed and a protocol was made to mark the eye to be oper-
ated with a skin marker pen.3. Discussion
Wrong-site surgery is perceived as a medical error that should
never happen, not a medical risk that the patient must accept,
and therefore a core patient safety problem. Legally, it quali-
ﬁes under the principle of res ipsa loquitur (Latin for ‘‘the thing
speaks for itself’’).In many states in the United States of
America, wrong site surgery is considered as a serious report-
able event, commonly referred as ‘‘never events’’ [1,3]. They
impose heavy ﬁnes and take strict disciplinary actions against
the surgeons and the anesthesiologist involved.
The National Quality Forum has published an updated
report on the serious reportable events in healthcare in theUnited States. The most recent version of this report categoris-
es events into six categories: surgical, product or device, pa-
tient protection, care management, environmental, and
criminal events. The ﬁrst category- surgical events is further
subdivided into (A) surgery performed on the wrong body
part. (B) Surgery performed on the wrong patient and (C)
wrong surgical procedure performed on a patient [1].
Furthermore, wrong-site errors affected the patient can be
classiﬁed into four groups. (1) Errors whose implications did
not reach the patient (near misses where the error was caught
before any care was rendered, documentation errors, or man-
agement of specimens). (2) Errors touching the patient, but not
violating the informed consent (topical drugs instillation in
wrong eye, surgical preparation involving the wrong site, or
preliminary radiological imaging in the wrong patient). (3) Er-
rors that resulted in initiating procedures covered by consents
and belated recovery (regional anaesthesia, skin incisions, or
incomplete operations) and (4) errors resulting in completion
of wrong-site deﬁnitive procedures in an OR (both open and
closed) [2].
Several policies and protocols have been made by various
health organizations and societies to eliminate wrong site surgery
[4–9]. Surgical site marking has been recommended as one of the
most pivotal aspects of patient care to prevent wrong site surgery.
According to the Universal Protocol promulgated by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
(JCAHO), the markmust bemade using an indelible marker that
is sufﬁciently permanent to remain visible after completion of the
skin preparation [4]. After a review of the available evidences, it
has been concluded that surgical site marking does not affect
the sterility of the surgical ﬁeld. Surgeons should be more conﬁ-
dent in conﬁrming preoperative marking as an effective compo-
nent in preventing wrong side surgery [10].
All these protocols have highlighted the importance of
doing a preoperative veriﬁcation involving the patient, mark-
ing the operative site, doing a time-out just before starting
the procedure, reviewing the radiological investigations before
surgery, and conﬁrmation of the procedure performed postop-
eratively [4–9]. To date, no deﬁnitive scientiﬁc studies have
been published on the efﬁcacy of these recommendations and
no one has reported a signiﬁcant decrease in the incidence or
number of wrong-site surgery events. It is difﬁcult to determine
a true incidence, not only because of a lack of a standard
threshold for what constitutes wrong-site surgery and docu-
mented under-reporting by healthcare providers but also be-
cause the denominator of the potential opportunities for
each of the distinct wrong-site errors is unknown.
The anesthesiologist plays an important role in preventing
wrong-site peripheral nerve blockade and surgery. The ‘‘prean-
esthetic site veriﬁcation’’ is an integral part of preventing
wrong site block and surgery. To ensure that it is carried out
before every peripheral nerve block, a unique multidisciplinary
approach was adopted in which the block needles were re-
moved from anesthesia carts and transferred to a separate con-
tainer in the area of the circulating nurse. The anesthesiologist
must now request a block needle from the circulating nurse
immediately prior to block performance and conﬁrm the site
at that time. This safety process emulates the presurgical site
veriﬁcation that takes place before a scalpel is passed to a sur-
geon [11,12].
More high-technology and fail-safe systems for preventing
wrong-side error do exist like a surgical navigation system and
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juncts though available in somemodern operating units are time
consuming and have not been found to be cost effective [13].
The opportunities for wrong-site surgery occur nearly all the
time, given high-risk patient situations and the realities of hu-
man behaviour, such as conﬁrmation bias. It has been seen that
prior knowledge of the patient, marking the operative site, nor a
formal time-out process just before incision are full proof sufﬁ-
cient barriers to prevent wrong-site surgery. In ideal circum-
stance, site veriﬁcation needs to start with the initial patient
encounter with the surgeon, continue through the initial recon-
ciliation and veriﬁcation process during the preoperative nurse
and patient encounter, occur at multiple critical points in the
OR, and actively engage the members of the patient’s operating
team, especially the surgeon and anaesthesia provider.
Neily et al. looked at incorrect surgical procedures reported
from Veterans Health Administration (VHA) Medical Centers
from 2001 to mid-2006 and provide proposed solutions for
preventing such events. The categories included 5 incorrect
event types (wrong patient, side, site, procedure, or implant),
major or minor surgical procedures, location in or out of the
OR, therapeutic or diagnostic events, adverse event or close
call, inpatient or ambulatory events, specialty department,
body segment, and severity and probability of harm. They
found that most common root cause of events was lack of
communication. They concluded that incorrect surgical proce-
dures are not only an OR challenge but also a challenge for
events occurring outside of the OR [14].
After an extensive literature review we have found that
wrong side surgery is considered as the most common reason
for wrong site surgery .These were closely followed by other
wrong-part reports involving wrong locations, wrong proce-
dure and even the wrong patient [2].
Wrong procedures were signiﬁcantly more likely to be con-
tinued to completion. It was seen that the most common theme
for wrong procedures was that the actions were based on faulty
documented information and/or reliance on memory. Wrong-
patient errors were signiﬁcantly more likely to be caught as
near misses at the beginning of the case and less likely to be
caught after patient contact, speciﬁcally during anaesthetic
blocks. Most wrong-site surgeries involved symmetrical ana-
tomic structures. Wrong-side errors were also signiﬁcantly
more likely to be caught as near misses or during the injection
of anaesthesia in the wrong location and less likely to go on to
complete wrong-side operations [2].
World Health Organization (WHO) aims to improve com-
munication and cohesiveness among team members at three
key mileposts: Before anesthesia is induced––‘‘Sign In’’ Before
the skin incision––‘‘Time Out’’ and before the patient leaves
the OR––‘‘Sign Out’’. A new 19-item checklist for safe surgery
from the World Health Organization (WHO) aims to improve
communication and cohesiveness among team member’s at all
three key mileposts [8]. The American Association of Nurse
Anesthetists (AANA) has endorsed processes described by
external organizations for the purpose of promoting safe sur-
gery and anesthesia. These include the World Health Organi-
zation’s (WHO) World Alliance for Patient Safety ‘‘Safe
Surgery Saves lives’’ initiative, the WHO ‘‘Surgical Safety
Checklist’’ and The Joint Commission’s ‘‘universal protocol.’’
The goal of the WHO Safe Surgery Saves Lives Campaign is to
improve the safety of surgical care around the world by ensur-
ing adherence to proven standards of care in all countries. TheWHO Surgical Safety Checklist has improved compliance with
standards and decreased complications from surgery in eight
pilot hospitals where it was evaluated [9].
Wrong site surgeries could affect a physician’s license to
practice medicine and also could have impacts from regulatory
and accreditation perspectives, which could then have signiﬁ-
cant public relations implications for the surgeon and any
associated health care organization. If a wrong site surgery
case does make it to trial, there is a signiﬁcant potential for
a punitive damage award by a jury, if pled or an inﬂated re-
ward to the patients.
At our 1000 bedded tertiary care centre in India we have
successfully implemented the ‘‘Safe Surgery Saves Lives
Checklist’’ and are actively educating all members of the vari-
ous operating teams to follow the simple and easy to use
checklist. The results will not be immediate but we do hope
to achieve a near 100% error free operating room record in
the years to come. We also initiated the concept of the ‘‘OR
brieﬁng’’ as a safety measure, in resident doctors and nurse
training programmes. Incorporating the ‘‘OR brieﬁng’’ into
residency training for surgery and anaesthesiology residents,
nursing training, and medical student training may prove ben-
eﬁcial in improving care coordination and reducing the inci-
dence of wrong-site surgery [15].
In general, wrong-site surgery does not ‘‘just happen’’ to
surgeons and surgical facilities. It is a monitor of the accuracy
and completeness of the information brought to the point of
care, the quality of professional communication, and the de-
gree of teamwork among the members of the operating
team.Systems must be developed to ensure maximum patient
safety and minimize preventable adverse events. The rate of
occurrence of wrong site surgery and related operating room
procedures is of much concern in today’s era of modern med-
icine. All anaesthesiologists are urged to be vigilant––to do
your part to prevent the tragedies resulting from surgery per-
formed on the wrong patient, a procedure other than the spe-
ciﬁc procedure intended, or on a wrong surgical site. Probably
the most important methods of reducing WSS is to have a con-
sistent and robust protocol that is universally followed.References
[1] National Quality Forum. Serious reportable events in
healthcare: a consensus report. Washington, DC: National
Quality Forum; 2002.
[2] Clarke JR, Johnston J, Finley ED. Getting surgery right. Ann
Surg 2007;246(3):395–403.
[3] Henriksen K, Battles JB, Marks ES, et al., editors. Advances in
Patient Safety: from research to implementation (volume 4:
programs, tools, and products). Rockville (MD): Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (US); 2005.
[4] The Universal Protocol for Preventing Wrong Site, Wrong
Procedure, and Wrong Person Surgery. Washington, DC: The
Joint Commission; 2009. Available at <http://
www.jointcommission.org/PatientSafety/UniversalProtocol/>.
[5] Wrong Site Surgery Summit addresses current problems, future
solutions. Jt Comm Perspect 2003;23(8):8–9.
[6] A follow-up review of wrong site surgery. Jt Comm Perspect.
2002; 22(1):10–1.
[7] Sentinel event trends in wrong-site surgery. Jt Comm Perspect.
2000; 20(1):14.
[8] WHO Guidelines for Safe Surgery (First Edition), Geneva,
World Health Organization, 2008.
196 D. Kapoor et al.[9] Haynes AB, Weiser TG, Berry WR, et al.. A surgical safety
checklist to reduce morbidity and mortality in a global
population. N Engl J Med 2009;360(5):491–9.
[10] Zhao X, Chen J, Fang XQ, et al.. Surgical site marking will not
affect sterility of the surgical ﬁeld. Med Hypotheses
2009;73(3):319–20.
[11] Stanton MA, Tong-Ngork S, Liguori GA, et al.. A new
approach to preanesthetic site veriﬁcation after 2 cases of
wrong site peripheral nerve blocks. Reg Anesth Pain Med
2008;33(2):174–7.
[12] Edmonds CR, Liguori GA, Stanton MA. Two cases of a wrong-
site peripheral nerve block and a process to prevent this
complication. Reg Anesth Pain Med 2005;30(1):99–103.[13] Bernstein M, Al-Anazi AR, Kucharczyk W, et al.. Brain tumor
surgery with the Toronto open magnetic resonance imaging
system: preliminary results for 36 patients and analysis of
advantages, disadvantages, and future prospects. Neurosurgery
2000;46:900–9.
[14] Neily J, Mills PD, Eldridge N, et al.. Incorrect surgical
procedures within and outside of the operating room. Arch
Surg 2009;144(11):1028–34.
[15] Makary MA, Mukherjee A, Sexton JB, et al.. Operating room
brieﬁngs and wrong-site surgery. J Am Coll Surg
2007;204(2):236–43.
